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ABSTRACT
The notion that something that cannot be measured does not exist seems to apply to
the absence of consideration of culture in economics, where the role of institutions is at
the center of the link between the two. Yet, economic prosperity, crisis, and deprivation
result from human behavior, reflecting the outcome of social learning—a central
concept of culture. Institutions and culture interact and evolve in complementary
ways. Each can affect the process of exchange and transaction costs, which in turn
determine economic performance. Although more work has been done to better
understand the interrelation between economics and culture, most falls on deaf ears
among mainstream economists, despite the fact that real-world cases show the critical
role of this interrelation. This paper discusses demonstrates a deficiency of mainstream
economics in its disregard of the role of culture and institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture
makes all the difference.” — (David Landes (1998), “Max Weber was right on”)
Following the tradition of the marginalist school, abstraction in economics received
a big push during the late 19th century, led by Stanley Jevons and Auguste Walras.
This occurred despite Adam Smith’s strong belief in the significance of culture
and Robert Malthus’ deep sense that culture affects the dynamics of population.
David Ricardo was most instrumental in reducing economics to a culture-free
abstraction. Alfred Marshall, at least judging from his early work, was another
proponent of this view, although his subsequent “Industry and Trade” shows an
increased awareness toward the complex cultural reality behind the abstraction of
supply and demand, with a strong institutional flavor in the analysis.
This is rather puzzling because the core of economics is actually exchange, and
the terms that permit an exchange are called the terms of trade, that is, the ratio
of the price producers are willing to receive and consumers are willing to pay for
the exchange. Indeed, while exchange is a fundamental part of economic behavior,
perhaps with the exception of game theory and transaction cost theory, remarkably
little attention is given to analysis of processes of exchange in the economics
literature. Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010) argue that the item exchanged, the
actors engaged in the decisions, and the physical, social, technological, and legal
environment within which the actors operate, matter in understanding transactions
and outcomes. The combination of those elements, the formation process of the
exchange, and the resulting transaction are considered an exchange configuration.
Mainstream economists contend that when there is a divergence between the
equilibrium price and the actual price at which the exchange takes place, either
excess demand or excess supply will be eliminated by price changes. But the actual
process of adjustment in the exchange is not satisfactorily explained, despite the
fact that, in reality, the whole process captures the satisfaction of those who trade.
Such satisfaction is a complex subject, but is necessarily an integral part of any set
of cultural relations involving trust, regret, deception, persuasion, and learning
processes.
The difficulty of identifying the relation and causality among culture,
institutions and economic performance has led to some work in this area. Becker and
Murphy (2001); Akerlof and Kranton (2010); Streeten (2006); Bénabou and Tirole
(2006); and the classic North (1990) on institutional economics are among the most
influential in this area. More narrowly focused and applied work is also prevalent.
Ang (2018), is one of many examples that tries to quantify the relationship between
culture (individualism) and economic development (technological innovation),
presumably through individual beliefs about the importance of innovation and
creativity. Nevertheless, most work on cultural economics continues to fall on deaf
ears among mainstream economists.
This paper discusses a deficiency of mainstream economics in that it overlooks
the role of culture and institutions, which should be an integral part of economics.
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II. MAINSTREAM AND CULTURAL ECONOMICS
Despite their arguments that clearly foreshadow cultural economics, it is unclear
why institutionalists like Thorstein Veblen (in the US) and Max Weber (in Europe)
failed to influence the mainstream of economics during the time. Indeed, one of
the critical questions in cultural economics is about the extent to which a particular
system of institutions that produce changes in culture will survive or fail precisely
because of such changes. Theoretically, it is the institutional system of legitimacy
that will survive and dominate, not the dynamics of power and wealth; without
legitimacy neither power nor wealth can be preserved.
This is particularly clear in monetary economics, where the use of formalistic
mechanical models is prerequisite and there is an almost complete lack of interest
in the cultural aspects within which the institutions of money and banking actually
operate. The models are filled with statistics and correlation (often confused with
causation) with little attempt to examine the actual processes involved. This is
irrespective of the fact that one cannot truly understand what is going on in the
banking sector unless we treat bankers as human beings and try to understand
how they really think. The same applies to players in the capital markets.
The move from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium in economics is
another example of neglect of the cultural dimension. While the overall quantities
produced and consumed are (correctly) not taken as resulting from individual
producer and consumer decisions (but rather the result of the interactions of such
decisions), it is often assumed in the corresponding model that the choices of a
“representative” utilitymaximizing individual coincide with the aggregate choices.
The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, a poster child of
central bank’s tool for policy analysis, is a noted example. The heterogeneity of
agents’ behavior and culture is considered irrelevant. This is not only unjustified
but also ill-suited for a serious policy making that deals with problems involving
coordination failures such as unemployment, under-utilization, inequality,
financial instability, and bankruptcy.
For most mainstream economists, when complexity increases and
interdependence grows, new variables, parameters and equations are added
and non-linearity is introduced, with the expectation that the model’s predictive
power will strengthen. Little effort is made to delve into the changing patterns of
behavior as part of possible mutations in the social system, where the process of
selection may involve increased vulnerabilities, bankruptcies, crisis, or simply a
loss of legitimacy.
Even in taxation, a system that emerges from the interaction of different
governmental subcultures, and where the tax system itself is the result of a long
historical process involving the changing culture of governments, and members
of parliament and their constituents, the efficiency of “one-way transfer” depends
not only on the perception of threat (legal sanctions for failure to pay tax), but also
the culture of tax collectors. The great mass of individuals paying taxes with a fair
degree of fidelity is itself clearly a cultural phenomenon. Yet, most research on tax
issues tends to be exclusively financial and economics-based, void of any cultural
context.
In a more micro and industrial organization subject, research works have
actually come very close to directly connecting culture and economic concepts,
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although these are more of the business schools’ domain, e.g., marketing, industrial
organization, and labor economics, where there is a long tradition of studying such
areas as collective bargaining, labor unions, culture of firm and factory. However,
even in these fields, mechanistic approaches have encroached on the analysis to
the point where no collaborative work with sociologists.
Yet, in supply–demand theory, for example, when excess supply occurs,
producers may alter their preference by avoiding efficiency efforts, and consumers
may not follow the standard law of supply–demand, as they may not increase their
consumption despite the downward pressure on price. In such circumstances,
preferences should not be taken as the only determinant of an economic process as
in a standard optimization model; rather, it should be learned during the process
of cultural transformation. Thus, the culture-affected learning process could
generate outcomes different from a standard solution.
The emphasis on learning is the crucial difference between mechanistic
economics and cultural economics, implying that cultural economics is
evolutionary in nature. Learning is part of social evolution, which is more complex
than biological evolution. It occurs more slowly because people, let alone societies,
are not willing to change easily, due to their realistic appraisal of the uncertainties
arising from such change, which is a standard problem in economic development.
In contrast, mechanistic economics relies on its predictive power based on
the derived parameters (assumed stable) of difference or differential equations.
This contradicts the fact that in any dynamic process, when strain increases, the
parameters in the system change. More importantly, the implied adjustment may
create further strain in the same part or in other parts of the system. If a crisis
eventually occurs, the absence of stability (order) with constant parameters may
not tell us much about the stability that is absent. Even if no adjustment is taking
place, something important about the social system may have been generated
by the absence of such adjustment. That is, what does not happen can be more
interesting than what does happen.
III. CAUSALITY
As in any relation between two components, culture and economics, the third,
fourth and other components may have some role as intermediate variables. This
applies to the link between culture and economic performance as well. There is
also the common problem of direction of causality.
On the first issue, at the outset, it is necessary to define culture and economic
performance. Various narratives for culture have been proposed, from which the
following elements are relevant: customary beliefs and values, preferences, long
duration of consistency in cultural traits and groups—whether social, ethnic or
religious. The relevant elements in economic performance are level and growth of
output or income, savings, and income distribution. In some cases, the probability
of something positive emerging is also used, such as having a greater number of
entrepreneurs.
Intermediate components relevant to identifying the link between culture and
economic performance include prior beliefs, religion, ethnicity, preferences, and
trust. Individually, these components may not have an independent role, but they
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can function as a coordinating device to make societies play the same “game” in
the face of different conditions and focal points.
The importance of prior beliefs cannot be overstated, as many decisions (and
thus the corresponding outcome and performance) are based on such priors (e.g.,
which technology to use, what measures to adopt to mitigate the effects of climate
change, how to deal with different economic shocks, what strategy to adopt to cope
with an aging population). Here, culture plays a major role in forming individual
beliefs, even in new environments and across generations. Thus, prior beliefs
can be an important channel of cultural influence on economic performance. Yet,
economists generally do not have much to say about such priors. They typically
assume that individuals have common priors.
Trust is an important component arising from priors. Many even believe that it
is through the concept of trust that culture enters the economic discourse. Research
demonstrates the contribution of the level of trust in a community to economic
performance (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Zak and Knack, 2001),
although most such research does not elaborate the mechanism through which
measured trust is positively correlated with economic performance. What remains
debatable is whether trust is an inherited cultural variable or is developed through
adoption of a proper legal system. Some also argue that trust is the outcome of
individual or societal interactions.
The significance of trust in economics is made clear by Arrow (1972): “Virtually
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any
transaction conducted over a period of time.” International trade is an example
of an area where trust is quite important. But it was the seminal work of Putnam
(1993, 2000) that put trust at the center of the discussion by considering it as a form
of social capital capturing the value and relationships of resources, where social
networks play a central role in the production of public and common good. The
constituent elements of social capital, over which people have more control than
over culture, are trust, norms, and networks.
In the current era of information technology, priors including trust can be
influenced or enhanced by the availability of information (e.g., “big data” and
“internet of things”). Examples of online trade and transactions abound where
reviews and reputation may alter the beliefs of people or customers. Even in
political elections, the use of “big data” combined with complex algorithms has
become widespread, and it has proven fairly effective.
The problems with causality are no less critical than the problems of definition.
The first problem is the difficulty in separating culturally based beliefs from
rational expectations. Whether trust is culturally driven or rational-prior driven by
environment with a prevailing degree of trustworthiness is not easy to determine.
It is generally the case that the idiosyncratic component of trust tends to increase
when societies share the same cultural trait (e.g., religion), and decreases with
genetic distance in terms of ancient cultural aspects. Level of education also
matters: the role of inherited cultural aspects in the formation of priors tends to
diminish as society becomes more educated (reduced dependence of trust on
cultural variables).

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2019

5

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 22, No. 1 [2019], Art. 5
128

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 1, 2019

Even if cultural variables and measures of economic performance are highly
correlated, one does not necessarily causes the other. Two events occurring
simultaneously does not imply causality.
Another serious conundrum is with regard to the direction of causality, or
what econometricians label the endogeneity problem: “which affects which.” The
debate about whether culture affects economics or vice versa has a long history.
Some propose that technology determines the type of social structure and dominant
culture. In supporting the argument that the steam-mill produces capitalism, Karl
Marx (1859) held this view. In contrast, Max Weber (1905) and Polanyi et al. (1957)
held the opposite line of thinking. To the extent that cultural aspects like religion
are considered important to the establishment of markets as well as in moderating
market excesses, these authors argue that culture—in this case religion—played
a critical role in the development of capitalism. Their explanations are powerful,
and the examples provided are quite persuasive; yet, they fell on deaf ears among
mainstream economists.
As expected, each camp attempted to have their idea vindicated. Economists
of the Chicago School tried hard to endogenize beliefs and preferences (Lucas,
1976; Stigler and Becker, 1977). Some went further by showing that religious
and social norms are the result of a group-level optimization. Others extended
the theory of human capital by emphasizing investment in social skills and
social interactions. Those who were more econometrically inclined emphasized
the use of proper econometric techniques to identify the direction of causality,
among others by employing a set of intermediate variables as the “instrumental
variables,” or by examining historical exogenous shocks in their models. But the
presence of complementarities between culture and economic performance often
hinders identification.
While differences between the two camps may never been reconciled, active
debate on the link between culture and economics continues. Most of this debate
emphasizes the interaction between culture and institutions.
IV. ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS
Institutions are meant to facilitate human interaction by maintaining patterns that
regulate societal behavior (North, 1990; Azis, 2000, 2008). These are the “rules of the
game in a society” by promoting certain behaviors and prohibiting others. There
are formal institutions (e.g., bank regulation, tax system, accounting rules) and
informal institutions (e.g., codes of conduct, habits, traditions, norms).1 While most
analyses focus on the former, the latter can be more important in understanding
the role of institutions in shaping economic performance. Enforcement is another
critical component of institutions. Even well-established rules and regulations
can be rendered ineffective if enforcement is weak. Two systems with similar
institutions may produce different economic performance because of differing
enforcement.
1

An organization, defined as a group of individuals bound together to achieve some objective, is also
part of institutions. An organization like government can influence otherinstitutions through which
economic performance is shape
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To the extent formal and informal institutions are shaped by ideas and
ideologies, not created in a vacuum, culture enters the equation. Through culturally
affected ideas, individuals use their subjective mental constructs to interpret the
world around them and make choices. Arguably, institutions determine the extent
to which ideas and ideologies, and hence culture, are important.
Informal institutions come from “socially transmitted information” and are
part of a heritage or culture. In the case of formal institutions, they are also linked
with the prevailing political system. For example, in federalist systems, markets are
fostered through competition for economic organizations at the sub-national level.
In other systems, room for pleasing powerful interest groups may be more ample.
The resulting economic performance under different systems (hence different
institutional arrangements) is likely dissimilar. In this respect, the resulting
economic performance can be associated with the efficiency of the outcome.
Contrary to neo-clastsical economic theory, negotiations required to reach
an efficient outcome are not costless. For example, there are costs for learning
(by consumers) about the quality—and eventually the price—of goods to be
exchanged. It may take some time before the actual exchange occurs. There can be
also a bargaining process as part of negotiations. This also entails costs.
The problem of information asymmetry can cause observed costs to deviate
from the true costs, making them more difficult to measure. Even if both parties
are honest, there is always something with respect to enforcing the agreement that
still needs to be specified, either implicitly or explicitly. This is also not costless.
When a dispute arises and a settlement (requiring lawyers) is needed, the costs can
further multiply.
All the above costs are known as transaction costs; they are usually high and
not always reported (not internalized), especially in developing countries. In
some cases, personalized transactions are still the rule rather than exception. High
transaction costs lead to unfavorable economic performance. Since only at zero
transaction costs can an efficient outcome prevail --the well-known Coase (1960)
theorem, attempts to lower transaction costs are preferred. The most common
method is through establishing clear property rights (also often deficient in many
developing countries) to facilitate the smooth functioning of markets.2
High transaction costs can also be linked to the size of the unproductive informal
sector. Small business operations and poor individuals, including poor migrants,
are “forced” to remain small and informal. Transaction costs to enter the formal
sector are too high (e.g., obtaining permits, which may require paying bribes and
be very time-consuming). Unsecured assets and a lack of formal documents also
diminish incentives to expand, and bank credit is difficult to obtain under such
circumstances. Thus, informality persists. So do inefficiency and low productivity.
In a dynamic context, an institutional framework ensuring that technology can
advance (‘creative destruction’) is also frequently absent in developing countries.
Free-entry and free-exit hardly prevail. Firms with privileged access to those in
2

In this context, transaction costs can be alternatively defined as the costs of transacting activity, which
includes defining, protecting and enforcing property rights to goods. It takes resources to measure
the attributes of goods and additional resources to define and measure rights that are transferred (in
an exchange). Such costs are uncharacteristically high because one party knows neither the complete
attributes of goods and services nor the characteristics of the agent and the other party.
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power survive by patronage through monopoly rights, soft budgets, or special
concessions. For them, no innovation is needed to survive. More seriously, they
resent any policy measures intended to enable innovation to raise productivity
when such measures threaten their survival. Power and influence enable them to
keep away potential competitors.
In short, culture-influenced institutions can affect transaction costs, and in turn
economic performance, in a static and dynamic sense. The latter works through
organizations’ decisions about technology and innovation.
Note that one cannot claim a superiority of direction of causality between
institutions and culture, because the two interact and evolve in a complementary
way. The relation also involves mutual feedback effects: depending on the type
of institutions, culture may evolve in differing ways, and different cultures may
cause institutions to function differently.
In this context, a more relevant economic performance measure is productivity.
While it is less directly observable compared to standard variables like output
and income, productivity involves attributes highly relevant to cultural traits and
cultural capital, particularly social capital.
In prosperous communities, Putnam (1993) argues that social capital is like
“physical capital and human capital-tools and training that enhance individual
productivity.” This author goes on to state that social capital refers to “features of
social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination
and cooperation for mutual benefit.” This description is unarguably loaded with
important implications.
By giving it the “same status” as other traditional inputs (capital and labor),
social capital contributes to productivity through a production–function setting
used extensively by economists. It also highlights the significance of individuals’
“participation,” which will form the group’s ability to work jointly through
“collaborative effort,” as capital. Failure to do so will result in disappointing
“productivity performance.” Absent trust-based relations, the system tends
to focus on “short-term self-interest” and individual transactions, eliminating
the potential and opportunity for accumulation and “innovation” processes as
in standard capital theory. While networks of institutions are important, their
presence in no way assures collaboration when “commitment and coordination” is
limited. This translates into obstacles for many developing and emerging markets,
where weak capacity, including the state’s capacity to effect “coalition building”
needed for “institutional upgrading” to support innovation must face a “growing
and diverse power of influence among social groups and business communities.”
All the above requisites and conditions (designated with quotation marks)
reflect institutional quality and social capital, which, through implied transaction
costs, determine the extent to which a country is able to sustain productivity
growth to improve society’s welfare.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Culture and economics are closely linked. Yet, economists have long been reluctant
to study the interrelation between them. This is partly because a testable hypothesis
with measured data that can be proven or disproven is hard to construct, let alone
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol22/iss1/5
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the difficulty in defining the term “culture.” This is unfortunate, as it reflects the
notion that something that cannot be measured does not exist. The reality is:
attempts to alter the incentive system through a policy may not on its own be
enough to improve the economic performance when the process is incompatible
with the prevailing cultural and institutional factors.
Faced with the reality of more complex relations and growing interdependence,
mainstream economists opt for adding new variables, parameters, and equations.
When pressed further, they introduce non-linearity into their models. Little effort is
made to delve into behavior that reflects the outcome of social learning—a central
concept of culture—where a set of cultural relations involving a learning process
as part of social evolution, which is more complex than biological evolution, is
important. The emphasis on learning implies that, unlike mechanistic economics,
cultural economics is evolutionary in nature.
The role of institutions lies at the center of the link between culture and
economics, particularly in the direction of causality. Institutions and culture
interact and evolve in a complementary way, not through a one-way causality.
Culture-influenced institutions can affect transaction costs, and in turn, economic
performance. In a dynamic setting, through organizations’ decisions about
technology and innovation, a set of requisites reflecting institutional quality and
social capital has an important role in influencing productivity growth and hence
societal welfare. One such requisite is individual participation, which will form
the basis of the group’s ability to work jointly through collaborative effort. The
required trust relation is in sharp contrast with short-term, self-interest driven
transactions.
Although more work has been carried out to better understand the interrelation
between economics and culture, albeit deficient of the precise mechanism how the
interrelation really works, most such work falls on deaf ears among mainstream
economists. Abstract culturalism and economic determinism should neither be
separated nor contrasted. It is mind-boggling how economics can be reduced to
a culture- and institution-free abstraction when there is abundant evidence from
real-world cases that shows otherwise.
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